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ABSTRACT 
 
The Aesthetic Turn in the Face of Nihilism. (May 2008) 
Benjamin Taylor Craig, B.A., Sonoma State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Theodore George 
 
 This thesis outlines one’s overcoming of nihilism by consulting two figures, 
Martin Heidegger and John Dewey.  Each thinker holds a pivotal role for art, such that, a 
turn to the aesthetic allows the individual to overcome this nihilistic age.  I intend to 
show that Heidegger and Dewey mutually inform each other’s project.  Heidegger is 
able to shed light on Dewey’s project; however, Dewey ultimately takes Heidegger’s 
thought a step further.  Heidegger understands the current age to be overcome with 
nihilism as a consequence of modern technological enframing as well the end of 
classical religious sensibilities.  Heidegger, like Dewey, relies on aesthetics to correct 
this dilemma.  Because of Heidegger’s diagnosis of the problem, we can see a new 
context for Dewey’s thought.  Dewey does not speak in the language of nihilism, 
however, through Heidegger, we can see that they share a similar concern.  Where 
Dewey takes Heidegger’s thought a step forward is in regard to Dewey’s emphasis on 
personal experience.  This emphasis shifts the responsibility of overcoming nihilism 
away from Heidegger’s poet and onto the individual.  Dewey understands aesthetics to 
be a process of experience and art to be the culmination of this experience.  This shift in 
responsibility is placed upon the individual because the individual is the arbiter of their 
 iv 
doings and sole recipient of their undergoings.  Consequently, the individual bears the 
consequences, and therefore the responsibility, of their experiences.  Meaning, each 
individual holds the tools necessary to overcome nihilism inherent in one’s own 
experience.  The name for the process of properly weathering one’s doings and 
undergoings is called the aesthetic life.  The turn to personal responsibility, in the 
aesthetic life, allows the people to be the genesis of change rather than necessitating a 
leader, or poet.  A community of people engaged in the aesthetic life is understood as 
democracy.  Dewey’s formulation of democracy, then, is not only a work of art but it 
also prevents the return of nihilism through the creation of a society always creating 
more possibility for its citizens. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Both Martin Heidegger and John Dewey view art’s foremost aesthetic function as 
a way to realign the individual’s proper relation to the environment.  Both understand art 
as a paideia resulting in personal and societal arête.  Correlatively, the purpose of this 
thesis is to bring Heidegger and Dewey into conversation with each other in order to 
answer the question “Where do we turn aesthetically to lead us out of nihilism?”  In 
answering this question, I hope to show that John Dewey and Martin Heidegger’s 
aesthetic theories mutual inform one another.  Without Heidegger’s contribution we are 
unable to see what is at stake for Dewey.  Even though Heidegger provides a proper 
framework for understanding John Dewey, Dewey thickens the discussion in Heidegger.  
Building on and surpassing Heidegger’s aesthetic theory, Dewey provides an 
experiential bedrock for the individual to save himself from nihilism.  This experiential 
bedrock will turn the responsibility for overcoming nihilism way from Heidegger’s poet 
and onto the individual.  Dewey accomplishes this through his emphasis on experience. 
The first chapter focuses on Heidegger’s contribution to art and the way in which 
art can deliver one out of nihilism. Nihilism is brought about by two things: technology 
obscuring being and the death of God which ends religious sensibilities.  These two 
events have created a potential for nihilism such that it is “waiting at our door.”
1
  
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format prescribed by The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition. 
1 Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 62. 
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Consequently, the condition of society is such that it is in a nihilistic abyss, abgrund.    
Heidegger, however, provides a way out of this abgrund.  Through the guidance of the 
poet, the individual returns to healthier outlook on the world.  The poet is able to better 
able to represent the tension between the earth and the world and thereby is better 
equipped to lead society out of nihilism.  This experience of the work of art affords the 
individual a perspective of unconcealed-ness.  Since the role of art has been ghettoized 
in the history of philosophy, Heidegger teaches us that the question of art is not useful to 
simply elucidate other ideas but important unto itself and can answer questions of first 
order importance.  In Heidegger the question of art is of central importance.   
The second chapter demonstrates the way in which Heidegger sheds light on 
Dewey’s aesthetic theory and how Dewey thickens the discussion in Heidegger.  This is 
demonstrated in two movements.  Firstly, I will show how understanding Heidegger can 
help bring new light to ideas in Dewey through a discussion of Heidegger and Dewey’s 
conception of the role of art.  Secondly, I will demonstrate how Dewey thickens the 
discussion in Heidegger through his emphasis on experience.  Dewey’s emphasis on 
experience turns the responsibility for the aesthetic turn introduced in the first chapter 
away from Heidegger’s poet and onto the individual.  Whereas an interaction with art in 
Heidegger begins with being and ends with the experience of the work or art, in John 
Dewey the interaction with art begins with experience.   
The third chapter demonstrates how Dewey’s aesthetics, including the 
consequences of placing the responsibility for this aesthetic turn on the individual, 
transforms our community.  The name given to a community of organisms aesthetically 
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engaged Dewey calls the Great Community or democracy.  Through presenting Dewey’s 
understanding of democracy, the Great Community, and their resistance to nihilistic 
totalitarian dictatorships, I hope to show one of the many upshots of Dewey’s aesthetic 
life, namely, that an aesthetic engaged community radically opens possibility.  Dewey’s 
aesthetics attempts to remove compartmentalization, dualisms, and habituation and 
increase communication and facilitate passionate living.  Democracy, therefore, takes on 
the same attributes.  Consequently, we notice that for Dewey this aesthetic work is also a 
work of art.  The purpose of the conclusion, then, will be to show how this turn toward 
individual responsibility creates not only an overflow of possibility through this 
transformed community but this transformed community also guards against nihilism’s 
return. 
However, before we are able to see this completed solution we must understand 
the problem we face.  As we turn to Heidegger, in the following chapter, he provides an 
excellent diagnosis of our current condition. 
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CHAPTER II 
NIHILISM AND THE AESTHETIC TURN 
 
 In the midst of the battle for Troy, Hector notices Achilles charging toward him.  
Afraid for his life, Hector flees.  He turns to face Achilles only after Athena tricks him 
into thinking that Deiphobus, his brother, is at his side.  Hector’s confidence rises.  It is 
only with Deiphobus that Hector thinks victory is possible.  Hector realizes Athena’s 
ruse after he turns to meet Achilles and Deiphobus vanishes.  After, Homer describes 
Hector as a man expecting the inevitable.  Hector laments: 
    My time has come! 
At last the Gods have called me down to death…. 
And now death, grim death is looming up beside me, 
no longer far away.  No way to escape it now….
2
 
 
The events led Hector to a place where he sees the end clearly.  It is because of these 
events that Hector seems to know what is coming next, almost as if his future were 
“standing at the door.” 
Martin Heidegger describes humanity’s current situation in much the same way.  
In his essay on Nietzsche, “The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead'," Heidegger argues 
that nihilism is “standing at the door.”
3
  Heidegger understands nihilism to be “the world 
historical movement of the peoples of the earth who have been drawn into the power 
realm of the modern age.”
4
  Nihilism is standing at the door for one reason with two 
direct implications.  Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s phrase, “God is dead,” proclaims 
                                                 
2 Homer, Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles (London: Penguin Classic, 1990), 551. 
3 Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 62. 
4 Ibid., 63. 
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the end of humanity’s religious sensibilities and that technology has constricted one’s 
experience to fit a certain structure.  The rise of the technological age not only destroys 
one’s religious sensibilities by constricting experience but also creates an environment in 
which every thing is viewed as what Heidegger will call “standing reserve.”  Though, 
where Homer provides no way out for Hector, Heidegger is more optimistic.  To carry 
the analogy further, in Homer’s Iliad Deiphobus standing beside Hector was only an 
illusion created by Athena, whereas in Heidegger’s understanding of our predicament 
Deiphobus is actually beside us.  For Heidegger, as we shall see, this Deiphobus is the 
poet. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the contribution Heidegger makes to the 
question “Where do we turn aesthetically to lead us out of nihilism?”  In order to achieve 
this it will demand an explication of Heidegger’s thought in relation to this question.  
Among other things, Heidegger’s response to the problem of nihilism teaches us two 
things.  One, Heidegger teaches us about the serious problem facing humankind, how it 
came about and how we can be lifted out of this bleak condition.  Two, Heidegger 
teaches us about a new significance and role for art.  Heidegger lifts art from the ghetto.  
Heidegger lifts art from its ghettoized role within the history of philosophy.  For 
Heidegger this means that the history of philosophy has treated questions in the 
philosophy of art as second-class questions.  The history of philosophy has quarantined 
the questions and concerns within the philosophy of art to secondary questions that do 
not reveal answers or the nature of things themselves.  This means, for Heidegger, that 
questions within the philosophy of art have been held hostage by conclusions of 
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questions deemed more important, usually within metaphysics, instead of questions of 
the philosophy of art being a source of discovering and inquiry itself.  Heidegger 
transforms art’s role to one of prominence and importance.  This transformed role of art 
will show the poet’s holds part in society’s escape from nihilism.
5
  
To this end, this chapter will have three sections.  The first section will focus on 
the subjugated role of art within the history of philosophy.  The second section will 
focus on the problems that arise because of society’s neglect of art, namely the rise of 
Heideggerian enframing and the end of religious sensibilities.  Finally, the third and final 
section will focus on how a return to art, the aesthetic turn, can steal us from the current 
nihilistic age which is challenging and depriving society.  These three sections combined 
aim to further Heidegger’s claim that the aesthetic turn can abate, confront, counteract, 
and eventually rescue us from the nihilistic abyss of the world’s night in which we find 
ourselves. 
What is significant about Heidegger’s contribution is where he turns in hope of 
abating the problem of nihilism.  This appeal to poetry and art represents a significant 
shift within the history of philosophy.  This shift is a shift away from the ghettoized role 
of art that has dominated much of the history of philosophy. 
Heidegger teaches us the importance of art.  This is significant because the 
history of philosophy has maligned the role of art and aesthetics.  One of the best 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that though Heidegger understands the poet to be the most qualified to approach 
the question of nihilism.  This does not mean that other artists are unable to confront the problem of 
nihilism.  All artists contain the perspective and attributes necessary to confront the problem of nihilism.  
Heidegger’s continual use of ‘poet’ in this respect is due to his claim that poetry is the pre-eminent mode 
of art.  In order to stay true to Heideggerian language, unless otherwise noted, the term “the poet” will 
refer to all artists. 
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examples of this diminished role of aesthetics is a surprisingly honest dictionary of 
philosophy entry referenced by Theodor Adorno: 
There is scarcely another philosophical discipline that rests on such flimsy 
presuppositions as does aesthetics.  Like a weather vane it is ‘blown about by 
every philosophical, cultural, and scientific gust; at one moment it is 
metaphysical and in the next empirical; now normative, then descriptive; now 
defined by artists, then by connoisseurs; one day art is supposedly the center of 
aesthetics and natural beauty merely preliminary, the next day art beauty is 
merely second-hand natural beauty.’…There is a double reason for this pluralism 
of aesthetic theories, which are often left unfinished: It resides on the one hand in 
the fundamental difficulty, indeed impossibility, of gaining general access to art 
by means of a system of philosophical categories, and on the other, in the fact 
that aesthetic statements have traditionally presupposed theories of knowledge.  
The problematic of theories of knowledge returns directly in aesthetics, because 
how aesthetics interprets its objects depends on the concept of the objects held by 
the theory of knowledge.
6
 
 
As Adorno rightly points out, this may very well be true but these are not attributes 
unique to aesthetics.  Aesthetics is no more controversial than any other discipline within 
philosophy.  There are no more differing opinions in aesthetics that cause it to “blow 
about” than in any other philosophical disciplines.
7
  The dictionary writer’s insight is 
neither sufficiently novel nor generous to aesthetics; however, the entry does reveal a 
certain paradigm within philosophy.  One does not need to look at aesthetics because it 
is derivative, depending “on the concept of the objects held by the theory of knowledge.”  
In other words, the philosophy of art is not interesting because it depends on theories of 
knowledge.  The author reveals a prevalent mindset within the history of philosophy that 
disregards questions of aesthetics as secondary concerns next to other questions within 
philosophy.   
                                                 
6 Qtd in Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press,1997), 332. 
7 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 333. 
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With few exceptions, art in philosophy has ordinarily been thought of one of two 
ways.  As Adorno points out,  
Philosophical aesthetics found itself confronted with the fatal alternative between 
dumb and trivial universality on the one hand and, on the other, arbitrary 
judgments usually derived from conventional opinions.
8
    
 
Traditionally, aesthetics has either been understood as something fixed and therefore 
grafted onto the questions of metaphysics; or, aesthetics has been understood as 
something unfounded, unjustified, unsubstantiated, decided solely on tastes, and, 
therefore, declared arbitrary by outsiders.  Nevertheless, many times, understanding 
aesthetics as solely concerned with tastes and the mere sensory was thought to be a 
consequence, repercussion, or implication of metaphysical questions. 
 Examples of both sorts are hardly scarce.  In illustrations of the first way, Plato 
removes art from the ideal society because of its potential danger.  As Heidegger 
understands Plato, the danger arises after Plato discovers that art, namely poetry, 
distracts men from truth, justice, temperance, and other metaphysical entities.  After 
Plato is able to identify and understand the metaphysical structure of reality, then, the 
implication of this discovery is that art is a problem.  For Heidegger, Plato’s exclusion of 
poetry may be interpreted as an example of the first way that art is subjugated.  Some of 
the central motifs within medieval philosophy can also be understood as examples of the 
subjugated role of art.  For both St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, questions of art 
and aesthetics are mere byproducts of questions of God and metaphysics.  Questions of 
art and aesthetics were discussed as implications to conclusions already reached in 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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metaphysics and theology.  Pope Gregory IX once referred to theology as “the Queen of 
the sciences”
9
 and, consequently, all edicts and rulings come down from the queen to her 
subjects.  Even though Augustine and Aquinas approach metaphysics from two different 
traditions
10
, questions of art contain the same method laid out by the church; art ought to 
work in the service of the church.  Despite some of the beautiful articulations that came 
from the some of the medieval theologians, specifically from Bonaventure and the other 
Franciscan philosophers in particular
11
, questions of art and aesthetics were understood 
as secondary to questions of religion.  Within these examples, questions of art are 
considered as byproducts of other questions.  The questions of art are simply the 
consequences of questions already determined. 
 Both Alexander Baumgarten and the entry from the dictionary of philosophy 
above can be understood as examples of the second way.  As the father of modern 
aesthetics, Baumgarten understands questions of aesthetics as judgments applied to the 
realm of the sensory
12
.  Art, then, only deals with things of the senses and does not have 
anything to say about “the big questions” within metaphysics.   If this is true, then, as the 
philosophy dictionary pointed out, art ought not to be discussed because no agreement or 
interpersonal insight could possibly be reached with regard to classical conceptions of 
truth or metaphysics.  As seen by the dictionary of philosophy’s author, if art is only for 
                                                 
9 Rubenstein, Richard.  Aristotle’s Children. (New York: Harcourt Inc., 2003), 173. 
10 For a discussion of these separate traditions consult, Etienne Gilson, The History of Christian 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955). 
11 Gregory Schrand, 1982, The Franciscan and Dominican Aesthetics in Middle English Religious Lyric 
Poetry., PhD diss., Rice University, in Rice University Digital Repository, 
http://rudr.rice.edu.ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/bitstream/handle/1911/15721/8216359.PDF, 8 
12 Martin Seel, “The Career of Aesthetics in German Thinking,” in German Philosophy Since Kant, ed. by 
Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 400. 
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the sensory and for affection, then any resulting answer from an aesthetic question could 
be blown “about by every philosophical, cultural, and scientific gust.” 
Heidegger, however, places emphasis on art because art is necessary to confront 
the problems created from modernity.  Only from an aesthetic turn can society hope to 
confront the problems of modernity. 
Humanity faces a serious problem.  Because of certain factors, however, 
humanity is unable to see the problem it faces.  Western metaphysics as we know it is at 
an end.  The end of structured, static, objective, and absolute metaphysics (such as 
Platonism) is at an end.  As Heidegger understands it, Nietzsche’s declaration “God is 
dead” is the flat line hum of classical western metaphysics.  Heidegger praises 
Nietzsche’s interpretation of the history of Western metaphysics “as the rise of 
nihilism,” yet, despite this praise, Heidegger, nevertheless accuses Nietzsche of being 
infected with this same nihilism himself.
13
  The end of classical Western metaphysics 
comes about for a couple reasons. One, the rise of the scientific and technological age 
demystifies and demythologizes our world, removing our need to abstract to religious 
sensibilities and miracles to explain natural phenomena.  Two, because science and 
technology have taken the place of religion, religious explanations become obsolete in 
such a way as to not hold sway over individuals within a community.  Three, this 
problem has been intensified by the entity that has taken religion’s place, technology.  
As Heidegger sees it, technology does not allow one to progress toward a solution to 
humanity’s problem.   
                                                 
13 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche,” 54. 
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It is important to note that in the course of western history the meaning of 
technology has undergone a significant change.  On one hand, as Heidegger points out, 
technology is closely tied to the Greek word techné, from where technology gets its 
name.  Since art was considered a kind of techné in ancient Greece one can not 
understand technology in a wholly negative light.  Fair enough.  Heidegger said, “What 
is dangerous is not technology.  Technology is not demonic.”
14
  However, since 
technology has taken on a much more complex dimension than that of its usage in 
ancient Greece, one has to consider Heidegger’s thoughts on technology holistically and 
from a modern perspective.  What is significant for this discussion is not whether 
technology is essentially corrupt or unredeemable but rather what technology means in 
the modern world and what its effects are upon those who use it.  The problem is with 
modern technology’s Gestell, or “enframing.”   
Heidegger reverses the common narrative regarding the rise of technology.  For 
Heidegger, it is this attitude of technological enframing that precedes and gives rise to 
modern science and technology, rather than the rise of technology that gives rise to 
technological enframing.
15
  In this view, technology creates a structuring.  This is not 
awfully significant since everything is a structuring.  However, the kind of structuring 
associated with modern technology is the structure of enframing.  Paul Gomer says, 
“This difficult notion [enframing] combines the idea of a technological way of revealing 
                                                 
14 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, translated by David Farrel Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collin 
Publishers, 1993), 333. 
15 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa, “Further Reflections on Heidegger, Technology, and the 
Everyday,”  Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, Vol. 23, No. 5, 339-349 (2003), 340. 
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in which entities are revealed as claiming us, taking possession of us.”16 This structuring 
from technology is one of the major contributors to the problem of nihilism because 
humankind not only because it is leveling, but, just as important, because we cannot be 
easily removed from this particular structure.  The enframing created by modern 
technology is one that is not easily cast off.   
Enframing is a problem because it “conceals a former way of revealing”, 
“conceals revealing itself”, “blocks the shining forth”, “blocks…the holding sway of 
truth”, and it also conceals unconcealment itself.
17
  Enframing prohibits and conceals the 
coming forth of Being.  Without the insight into the pure unconcealment of Being, 
humanity has no access into the truth of Being itself.  This is because truth is an event, 
requiring and depending on the passing and moving of time. Enframing, however, blocks 
the coming forth of events in such a way that it stills life.  Heidegger says, “Will we see 
the lightning-flash of Being in the essence of technology?  The flash that comes out of 
stillness, as stillness itself?  Stillness stills.  What does it still?  It stills Being into the 
coming to presence of world.”
18
  The stillness of enframing stills because enframing can 
not bring forth the event of truth and because objects are contorted from objects that are 
and appear as themselves into objects as standing reserve.  The stillness of enframing 
discloses no truth.  
Enframing holds the individual within one way of viewing the world.  As we will 
see, this is a problem because it does not allow the individual to see what Heidegger will 
                                                 
16 Paul Gomer, Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 177. 
17 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 333. 
18 Martin Heidegger, “The Turning” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated 
by William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 49. 
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refer to as the “earth,” the realm of disclosure.  It is precisely this enframing that is the 
most dangerous to society’s unfolding, since enframing prohibits unfolding.  The 
individual caught up in this enframing is not able to respond properly to much advice 
given from other.  Advice such as, one ought to “walk a mile in another’s shoes”, “get 
another perspective”, or “see things differently”.  Enframing creates problems for 
empathy as well, evident in such statement as, “you don’t understand me”, “this isn’t my 
problem”, “you don’t get me”, or “you just can’t see why I am angry”.  In other words, 
the one caught up in an enframed structure is not able to see the world from any other 
structure, not able to understand any other worldview, or not able to empathize properly 
with others.  This is why Heidegger says, “where enframing reigns, there is danger in 
the highest degree.”
19
  Since modern technology is in enframing there is danger in the 
highest degree. 
Enframing gives rise to this standing reserve.  Technology gives rise to 
enframing; enframing both aggressively structures one’s outlook or worldview as well as 
gives rise to standing reserve.  Is modern technology a danger or a problem, something 
that needs to be overthrown and abandoned or simply carefully watched?  What 
evidence is there that this enframing within modern technology is actually a problem?  
After all, enframing is also a kind of revealing and a kind of bringing-forth.
20
  As Paul 
Gomer says, “Technological revealing is not a bringing but a demanding; and this 
demanding does not have the character of bringing forth but forcing out.  It demands of 
                                                 
19 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 333. 
20 Ibid., 295. 
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nature that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored.”
21
  Modern technology is 
a problem for two reasons.  One, enframing creates a structure that oppresses the 
individual and does not allow any kind of removal or getaway from the structure.  And, 
two, the enframing created by modern technology reveals objects not as objects but as 
“standing reserve.”  The first problem in modern technology holds the individual within 
enframing and does not release its captors.  Enframing cannot release its grasp because it 
is a stilling, a demanding, and a forcing.  Enframing does not leave any room for any 
other worldview.  The second problem in modern technology is the standing reserve that 
arises from one’s dependence on technology.  Standing reserve is a problem because it 
does not allow the individual to view the object-in-itself but rather as an object-for-
observer.  When one views things as standing reserve, “the forest is lumber, the Rhine is 
hydroelectric power, the land is mineral resources, the worker is labor, and the worth of 
the product is entirely defined by exchange value.”
22
 An individual plagued by standing 
reserve views things only as they could be helpful to the individual.  Evidence is evident 
in disastrous statements like “why should I care?  It doesn’t effect me” or “what’s in it 
for me.”  Standing reserve turns that which ought to be affective into a consideration of 
the effective.  
With the rise of technology comes the end of religious sensibilities.  Because 
western humanity has abandoned its religious sensibilities, technology has taken its 
place.  The word of Nietzsche declares the end of these sensibilities.  By the end of 
                                                 
21 Gomer, Heidegger’s Being and Time, 175. 
22 Teschner, George. "The Humanities and Telecommunication." 20th WCP: The Humanities and 
Telecommunication. 25 Aug 2000. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Tech/TechTesc.htm. 
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religious sensibility I mean the end of a suprasensory world’s power over the lives of 
human beings.  The end of this power means that humanity is left to its own devices, that 
help can come from nowhere but from within society.  Since the power of the 
suprasensory world is attributed to God, to say that the suprasensory has no power over 
the lives of human beings is to say that God no longer has power over the lives of human 
beings.  And, to say that God no longer has power over the lives of human beings is to 
say that God is dead.
23
  This is not a simple denial of Christianity nor is it a simple 
metaphysical conclusion.
24
  Nihilism is not a problem where Christianity is simply 
disowned because the simple negation of a religious structure is still a kind of religious 
structure.  Humanity is nihilistic because there is no exterior or suprasensory place to 
turn for answers.   
Our current situation, then, is bleak.  As stated above, nihilism, for Heidegger, is 
the whole of the modern mindset and society’s retreat from a religious understanding of 
the world contributes and exacerbates this modern mindset.  We are trapped within 
technology’s enframing.  This enframing conceals the unconcealed earth that is 
necessary for the shining forth of being.  The modern individual is not afforded 
abstraction for justification of their actions.  Abstractions such as religion and strictly 
structured metaphysics are things that sway no more hearts.
25
  The absence of these 
sources of meaning creates a void.  Unfortunately, technology has filled the void.  
                                                 
23 This is not a metaphysical or religious claim but a societal claim.  My scope is societal not religious.  
This is to say that within society God has lost influence, authority, and society’s obeisance. 
24 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche,” 61. 
25 This claim that structured metaphysics and religion “sways no more hearts” is a condensed derivation of 
the Heideggerian point that “if the suprasensory world of the Ideas has suffered the loss of its obligatory 
and above all its vitalizing and upbuilding power, then nothing more remains to which man can cling and 
by which he can orient himself.” (Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche,” 61) 
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Technology has complicated the situation because the individual is not afforded access 
to the one thing that could deliver society from its nihilism, art.  Technological 
enframing restricts the earth and thus restricts truth in such a way as to prevent the 
individual from experiencing a coming forth of the event of truth.  The artist is the one 
that is able to rescue the individual from the enframing caused by the rise of the 
technological age and the effluence of religion’s absence. 
As Heidegger sees the solution to society’s condition, there is no way simply to 
correct the problem as a car, robot, or as an appliance is fixed.  Unfortunately, though, 
this problem cannot be thusly fixed.  By “correct the problem,” I mean that there is no 
way to go back to the condition before the problem was created.  In reference to the 
death of God, Nietzsche stated, “Who will wipe this blood of us?  What water is there 
for us to clean ourselves?  What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have 
to invent?”
26
  Heidegger agrees; no atonement can be made for such a colossal event.  If 
one makes an attempt to correct the problem, then one must deceive oneself into 
believing the scientific revolution never happened and society is in a condition that it is 
not.  One would have to close themselves from a great number of things.  To attempt to 
correct the problem one would have to live an inauthentic life apart from or deceived of 
society.  Though Heidegger’s words are grim, the serious problem we face is not without 
hope.  Our hope is the poet.  The poet is able to see the serious problem humanity faces 
and the artist’s art is the only thing that can potentially turn the course of history out of 
this nihilistic abyss.   
                                                 
26 Walter Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1968), 95-96.  
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It is necessary to make an aesthetic turn in order to solve the problems that the 
nihilistic age poses.  In “What are Poets for?” Heidegger describes the poet’s role in the 
abyss, or Abgund.  As indicated above, the one able to offer victory from nihilism is the 
poet, our Deiphobus.  However, before I address exactly how the poet counteracts the 
affects of the nihilistic age, I would like to motivate the need for an aesthetic turn in 
order to confront the problem of nihilism by talking about the unique position and 
perspective of the poet. 
Heidegger spoke of this dark time in history as “the world’s night.”  At this point 
in history, humanity is facing the world’s night because humanity is facing an end to the 
day of the gods.  When the gods, Hercules, Dionysius, and Christ, left the world it 
marked a time when the world began its decent into night time.  The world’s night 
creates the abyss society finds itself in and the one that the poet will pull us through.  
This world’s night is a destitute time.  Heidegger states, “Long is the destitute time of 
the world’s night.”
27
   Nevertheless, Holderlin states,   
    But where there is danger, there grows 
    also what saves 
28
 
 
As Holderlin recognizes, the coming of the world’s night also brings about that which 
saves humanity from the world’s night.  Art and the artist can lead society out of the 
world’s night but not without this destitute time first being experienced and endured.  As 
Heidegger says, “in the age of the world’s night, the abyss of the world must be 
experienced and endured.  But for this it is necessary that there be those who reach into 
                                                 
27 Martin Heidegger, “What Are Poets For?”  in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: Perennial Classics, 1971), 91. 
28 Ibid., 115. 
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the abyss.”
29
  Even though the world’s night must be experience and endured, the poet is 
able to reach into this abyss and pursue the gods who have left and plunged us into the 
world’s night, “the fugitive gods.” 
What does it mean to be a poet in a destitute time?  Heidegger answers, “To be a 
poet in a destitute time means: to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods.  This 
is why the poet in the time of the world’s night utters the holy.”
30
  This means the poet 
utters both that which is set apart for sanctified use and that which will save society.  
This is why, in Holderlin’s language, “the world’s night is the holy night.”
31
  The poet is 
that individual that is able to reach into the abyss and pull society through the world’s 
night.  The poet allows society to endure the world’s night.  The poet in a destitute time, 
then, gives chase to the fugitive gods, the ones that have left and in their leaving they 
leave behind an abyss.  The poet does not hope to fill this abyss; but, rather, the poet 
hopes to pull us through this abyss, conquer the world’s night, and end this nihilistic age.   
The poet confronts the symptoms of the nihilistic age and also counters the 
nihilistic age itself.  In order for the aesthetic turn to counter and confront the problem of 
nihilism sufficiently it must speak to the three direct implications from the rise of the 
technological age.  These three implications are also the three symptoms of our nihilistic 
age.  The poet confronts the effects of the nihilistic age by confronting these three 
implications or symptoms.  The poet is capable of confronting the symptoms of the 
nihilistic age because the poet can break the hold of technological enframing, transform 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 91. 
30 Ibid., 92 
31 Ibid. 
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things from standing reserve, and the poet can renew religious sensibilities.  The poet 
can also counter the nihilistic age itself because of the very nature and character of art. 
If we are to accept the Heidegger’s diagnosis of the problem, then there are a 
couple of ways to approaching the problem that are not accessible to us.  These kinds of 
particular paths are from an aporia.  For example, this problem cannot be corrected 
simply by resurrecting religious sensibilities.  Rather, the poet replaces religion’s 
suprasensory sway over the hearts of human beings within the work of art.  This 
replacement is similar because both the suprasensory and art are external to the 
individual and hold sway over the hearts of human beings.  Heidegger, in “The Word of 
Nietzsche,” points out that the declaration, “God is dead,” forbids the individual 
abstraction to the suprasensory world.
32
  Though the poet’s poetry is not suprasensory, it 
still renews that which is significant of the suprasensory, the ability to sway the hearts of 
human beings.  The ability to sway the hearts of human beings renews religious 
sensibilities. 
Art and the artist are able to counteract the effects of the death of God in two 
ways.  One, as stated above, the poet during the world’s night utters the holy, where holy 
is understood as that which saves society and also that which sanctified.  The poet is the 
one speaking of the fugitive gods in such a ways as to lead to a holy night.  It is still a 
destitute time because it is still a night; however, because artists give chase to the 
fugitive gods their words are set apart as holy.  Two, art renews the beneficial aspects of 
the suprasensory without referring to something abstract.  The beneficial aspect of the 
                                                 
32 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche,” 61. 
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suprasensory was the sway that it held over the hearts of human beings.  The work of art 
has this sway over the hearts of human beings.  Poetry and art affect us as people; they 
sway society.  Art is something external to us so, when we come into contact with it, it 
affords us the opportunity to interact within something that affects and sways us.  The 
very reason that Plato exiles poetry from the ideal city is for the same reason that 
Heidegger reveres poetry.  Poetry promises to sway the hearts of human beings.  Though 
we are in the world’s night, the poet renews the aspects of the religion that sway the 
hearts of human beings. 
The poet is that individual who is better equipped to escape the “enframing,” 
Gestell, created by the rise of the technological age.  If art is anything, then art is a new 
perspective.  This new perspective is exactly that which breaks the strict and stagnate 
structuring caused by enframing.  Art is, essentially, the perspective of the artist.  When 
one looks at a landscape painting one can not see lumber.  The presentation of the artist 
presents objects as they are.  When one looks at a painting the art speaks to the 
individual rather than the individual imposing their enframed view to the painting. 
Poetry shakes one from technological enframing by bringing forth an event of truth.  As 
will be shown, Heidegger describes this event of truth in his “Origin of the Work of Art” 
as the interplay or tension of the earth and the world.
33
  This tension breaks enframing 
because of the event of truth.  Enframing is a stillness and art is a shifting, a shaking, and 
a moving of being.   
                                                 
33 Johnson, Patricia, On Heidegger (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000), 51. 
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The last way that art counteracts the effects of the nihilism brought about by the 
world’s night is the transformation of things away from standing reserve.  Enframing, we 
have said, gives rise to a perspective of objects simply as standing reserve.  Art is able to 
counteract this standing reserve by shifting our view of objects from stagnate objects to 
objects that are and appear as objects in themselves; this way in which objects present 
themselves Heidegger calls a “thing thinging.”
34
  When one looks at a painting of 
someone in the forest, the individual is forced to ask “what is going on here?”  This 
inquiry into the painting prohibits one to then revert back to viewing the trees simply as 
lumber. The individual views the person in the forest as the artist wants the individual to 
view the forest.  When one looks at the Peasant’s Shoes by Van Gogh, one is unable to 
look at the shoes and only remark “I wonder if those shoes would look good on me.”  
Because of the way in which the shoes are presented, one is unable to see the shoes only 
as potentially useful to them.  One must see something much more fundamental, namely 
the interplay of earth and world.  Heidegger says, “Truth happens in Van Gogh’s 
painting.  This does not mean that something is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the 
revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes, that which is whole—world and earth 
in their counterplay—attains to unconcealedness”
35
  This unconcealedness of the being 
of the shoes as is that which is more fundamental.   
Someone who views the world as standing reserve has a vain view of the world; 
the world’s objects are only for his or her use.  When someone stands before a great 
                                                 
34 Dreyfus and Spinosa, “Further Reflections on Heidegger, Technology, and the Everyday,” 344. 
35 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert 
Hofstadter (New York:  Harper and Row, 1971), 54. 
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work of art, it reverses the order of priority such that it dwarfs the individual in the face 
of the work’s magnificence.  When this order of priority is reversed a vain view of the 
world is impossible; and, consequently, seeing the world only in terms of standing 
reserve is impossible.  When someone stands before Michelangelo’s David, one is 
unable to simply say “I wonder if he could do something for me.”   
The artist, then, confronts the symptoms of this destitute time in each of the three 
ways.  The artist renews religious sensibilities by providing something exterior to 
ourselves that sways the hearts of humankind.  The artist removes technological 
enframing by providing us with alternative points of view, opening ourselves up to new 
possibilities, and bringing forth an event of truth.  And, finally, the artist removes 
enframing’s standing reserve by providing something whose magnificence stands over 
us, which breaks our vain view of objects. 
The foregoing considerations have concerned experiencing and enduring the 
world’s night, but the artist is also able to turn or lead society out of the world’s night.  
In what way does the artist help the world come out of this destitute time? The poet is 
able to lead society out of the world’s night for a very specific reason.  Heidegger says, 
“The time remains destitute not only because God is dead, but because mortals are 
hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality.”
36
  The poet, then, teaches us of 
our own mortality.   
The work of art informs the individual.  This informing is a kind of teaching.  
This teaching is important. As indicated above, Heidegger says that the world’s night 
                                                 
36 Heidegger, “What are Poets for?” 94. 
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will not end until mortals are able to grasp their mortality.  The work of art teaches the 
individual of his or her mortality.  As Patricia Johnson puts it, “The most immediate 
reality of the work of art is not that it is a thing, but that it is an event of truth.”
37
  This 
event of truth has a very specific structure.  This event of truth of the work of art is a 
tension.  It is by way of this tension that one confronts one’s own mortality.  This tension 
is a play between what Heidegger calls, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the earth 
and the world. The world is understood as the realm of total unconcealedness and the 
total disclosed.  The earth is the realm that is presented to us, but it is also more that that. 
The earth is, for Heidegger, the realm of the materials.  The earth is concealed in so far 
as rocks do not teach.
38
  In explication of Heidegger’s conception of earth Patricia 
Johnson points to Heidegger’s example of the Greek Temple.  She says, “The temple is 
certainly made of stone. But it is not about the stone.  It is about religious experience and 
the human relationship to the divine.”
39
  Where the stones of the temple represent the 
earth, the world represents the meaning behind it.  The event of truth comes about 
through this tension between the earth and world.  The work of art perfectly represents 
this conflict, tension, or strife between the concealed and the cleared, between earth and 
world.  Heidegger says, “Earth juts through the world and world grounds itself on the 
earth only so far as truth happens as the primal conflict between clearing and 
concealing.”
40
  The work of art is a shifting tension between these two.  No work of art 
is simply one or another but a playing between the two.  It is through this strife or 
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38 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 172. 
39 Johnson, on Heidegger, 51. 
40 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 54. 
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tension that truth happens.  This is why the work of art is an event of truth.  Heidegger 
says, “Truth establishes itself as strife within a being that is to be brought forth only in 
such a way that the strife opens up in this being; that is, this being is itself brought into 
the rift.”
41
  This event of truth teaches us of our mortality.   
If we return to Michelangelo’s David, this tension might better be illustrated.  
When one stands in front of Michelangelo’s David one can not help but notice the desire 
for David to leap to life.  People surrounding Michelangelo’s masterpiece normally and 
casually remark “he is so lifelike” or “he looks so real.”  The tension between earth and 
world is this realization.  This realization is the tension between realizing the lifelike 
aspects, the apparent realness of the sculpture, and conceding that this realness is still 
encased in stone.  The encased movement of the David looks as though at any moment 
he will free himself from his podium; however, one still knows that the King of Israel 
remains encased in stone.  This is the play between stone and life, between world and 
earth, and between the concealed and the unconcealed.  Patricia Johnson says of 
sculptures that “these figures reach towards a world of openness, but at the same time 
are not free from the stone.  They show us the tension of our historical experience.”
42
   
This teaching of the historical experience shows us our finitude.  When one 
confronts the finiteness and the finality in the tension of their historical experience, one 
is confronted with his or her own mortality.  This is because one cannot see the tension 
of one’s historical experience without noticing his or her radical temporality.  When one 
confronts this finiteness, one understands that there was a time when he or she did not 
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exist and there will be a time when he or she will exist no more.  This is their 
confrontation with their mortality.  This confrontation with our own mortality leads us 
out of this destitute time of the world’s night. 
Since the work of art creates a tension between the earth and the world, it gives 
rise to this experienced strife.  This strife shows us the tension of our historical 
experience.  Since this historical experience cannot be experience apart from being 
confronted with one’s radical temporality, the work or art teaches one of his or her 
finality and finitude.  Because of this artist is, through art, able to lead society out of the 
destitute time of the world’s night. 
Where does humanity go once the world’s night has been experienced, endured, 
and eventually escaped?  Since society cannot simply regress to the days of the gods and 
cannot go back into the grasp of modern technology’s enframing, where must society go 
from here in order to prevent relapse and to secure a proper and nutritious life outside of 
this nihilistic age?  The answer I would like to pose is that for a proper and healthy 
escape from nihilism the burden of responsibility must shift from the poet to the 
individual.  The way in which I hope to motivate this shift is through John Dewey’s 
notion of experience and the aesthetic life.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
SHEDDING LIGHT ON EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
In Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451, Guy Montag is opened to the world around 
him with the help of a little girl.  With simple questions and observations, Clarisse 
McCellan opens Guy Montag’s mind to the surrounding possibilities.  At first Montag is 
able to shake off Clarisse’s comments as comments from a mere foolish girl.  However, 
little by little, her comments begin to haunt Montag’s experience.  In light of 
Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” it might be said that Montag’s mind is shaken 
from the grasp of his cultural epoch and opened to the possibilities of his surroundings.   
Clarisse challenges Montag in two important ways.  One, Clarisse challenges him 
to re-experience the environment around him.  She says,  
I sometimes think driver don’t know what grass is, or flowers, because they 
never see them slowly…If you showed a driver a green blur, Oh yes! he’d say, 
that’s grass!  A pink blur!  That’s a rose garden!  White blurs are houses.  Brown 
blurs are cows.
43
 
 
And two, Clarisse pulls Montag out of what, with Heidegger, might be called his 
enframing by asking personal questions that force him to reevaluate his relation to the 
environment.  She says,  
“Good night!”  She started up her walk.  Then she seemed to remember 
something and came back to look at him with wonder and curiosity.  “Are you 
happy?” she said.
44
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Both of these ways pull Montag out of his enframing and to a place that is 
uncomfortable and foreign. 
One morning Montag wakes to find Clarisse not present for their morning walk.  
Montag begins to frantically search for the same thought provoking dialogue that 
Clarisse was able to provide.  This search ultimately leads him to turn inward with the 
help of an English professor he remembered meeting.  It is this inward turn that forces 
Montag to escape his oppressive society.  Though Clarisse provided the basis for 
Montag to escape his enframing, ultimately, Montag was not free from the control of his 
society until he felt the responsibility to escape his own enframing. 
In Bradbury’s novel, the involvement of Clarisse and the old Professor functions 
similar to the way Dewey and Heidegger mutually inform each other.  Clarisse’s 
comments affect Montag in such a way as to force him to see the world in a new way.  
Montag met the old professor before he met Clarisse and was not affected.  It was only 
after his morning walks with Clarisse that he was able to see the relevance and 
importance of the professor to his situation.  Montag’s encounter with the professor were 
directly informed by the meetings with Clarisse.  It was not the success of Clarisse or the 
professor; rather, it took both of them for Montag to overcome his nihilistic society.  
Montag was not able to understand the full impact or importance of the professor until 
he first understood Clarisse. The old professor and Clarisse mutually informed each 
other’s purposes.  In the same way, Dewey and Heidegger mutually inform each other.       
In this third chapter, I intend to show that while Heidegger sheds light on 
Dewey’s project, Dewey’s emphasis on experience compliments and thickens 
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Heidegger’s approach.  Specifically, Dewey’s focus on experience shows that each 
person is capable of and responsible for overcoming nihilism.   
Accordingly, this chapter will have three movements.  The first movement will 
focus on showing how Heidegger can shed light on Dewey through a discussion 
regarding the importance of art and the meaning extracted from life.  Though John 
Dewey does not invoke the language of nihilism, he, nonetheless, conceives the role of 
art in much the same way.  I hope to demonstrate this by showing how their similar 
concern for the role of art can be informed by the Heidegger’s understanding of the 
problems facing society.  The second movement, and the bulk of this chapter, will focus 
on John Dewey’s emphasis on experience.  This second section will chronicle Dewey’s 
understanding of experience as the bedrock of every aspect of life, including art.  The 
second section will lead into the third.  Through Dewey’s emphasis on experience, 
Dewey shows us that each person is responsible and capable to overcome nihilism.  
Therefore, the third movement will focus on how this experiential bedrock leads to 
personal responsibility.  This third movement will fall out of the two earlier ones.  If we 
read Dewey within this Heideggerian framework it becomes evident that Dewey moves 
beyond Heidegger in an important respect: one’s individual responsibility for his or her 
escape from nihilism.  Consequently, the individual is able to overcome nihilism through 
art. 
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In the epilogue to “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger suggests that 
perhaps experience brings about the death of art.
45
  This cryptic phrase does not mean 
that experience itself brings about the death of art; this would suggest that Heidegger has 
committed a grievous error.  After all, for Heidegger also, the experience of art is 
strikingly important.  Heidegger, I believe, means something much more profound.  If 
merely subjective experience is the criterion by which art is distinguish as art, absent of 
any kind of ontology, then art dies.  Art dies because it can then no longer be approached 
as an event of truth.  This does not invalidate Dewey’s concerns.  For John Dewey, 
aesthetic experience, or having an experience, is an event of truth. 
And, thus, for John Dewey experience is the basis of distinguishing art and 
aesthetics.  If one looks at Dewey in light of Heidegger, however, then Dewey’s 
emphasis does not bring about the death of art.  Dewey’s reliance on experience applied 
within this Heideggerian framework shifts the realm of responsibility from the poet to 
the hands of the individual.  This shift of responsibility, from the poet to the individual, 
is a necessary move for a proper escape from nihilism. 
Under a concern for the importance of art, Dewey and Heidegger compliment 
each other’s claims regarding the role of art.  Art, for both thinkers, is seen as solving 
central problems arising from society; and, at the same time of this rescue, art is able to 
return the individual to a healthy dispensation, mode of existence, or an overall 
recrudescence of life’s vim.  Specifically, art addresses questions having to do with 
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one’s relation to the world as well as an individual’s proper relation to their 
environment.   
As was noted in the last chapter, art, for Heidegger, takes central importance 
because art removes the structure of enframing by returning objects to objects in 
themselves, a thinging thing, instead of the standing reserve created by technological 
enframing.  Consequently, art then brings about the salvation of the world.  Meaning, it 
is through art that society is able to be saved from modernity’s fallen society, where this 
fallen society is understood as a society that has surrendered to the threat of nihilism.  
Art brings about the salvation of the world because it saves society from our fall into 
nihilism.  Also, as a result, art creates a healthy individual as well as a healthy society.  
Art teaches an individual of their mortality.  The consequence of this teaching is an 
individual shaken from an essentially egotistical view of life.  The individual, once 
removed from the nihilistic age, is able to see objects just not in terms of their usefulness 
to him or herself.  The individual, then, is able to take into account the surrounding 
environment and the needs of the society.  Art opens up the individual from their 
egotistical outlook and transforms their world into one that takes into account more than 
just him or herself but also the environment and the society around them.   
In the same way, art for John Dewey creates a healthy individual.  Art for John 
Dewey is first understood as creating a healthy individual.  Art breaks the monotony of 
habit by bringing about an experience from one’s environment that the individual must 
respond to.  Habit, according to Dewey, constricts the vitality of our experience resulting 
in inchoate experience.  And, consequently, forces the individual to confront the 
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environment around them by severing experience subjected to habit.  Art puts the 
individual in sync with their environment.  Like Heidegger, John Dewey’s philosophy 
also holds art in high regard.  Dewey’s project could be understood as the attempt for 
society, writ large, to realize their potential to change the world.  This can only be 
achieved through artistic means.  Consequently, art is defined broadly.  As we will see, 
the reason for this broad definition is to provide for art the ability to pervade and 
inundate every aspect of our life and to make the individual and their experience the 
center of this aesthetic revolution. 
John Dewey does not write in the language of nihilism that one finds in 
Heidegger.  However, through an understanding of Heidegger, one finds that Dewey has 
similar concerns.  Consequently, art and aesthetics are capable of correcting problems 
set forth by modernity.  And, moreover, although Dewey does not speak this way, art is 
also capable of overcoming a sense of meaninglessness.  Art engenders meaning. 
Dewey writes, “there are two sorts of possible worlds is which esthetic 
experience would not occur.”
46
  He goes on to describe these two worlds: one world of 
complete flux and one world completely devoid of flux.  As Heidegger shows us, a 
world devoid of flux holds the same implications of a nihilistic age.  In Heidegger’s 
language, a world devoid of flux is enframed, or stilled.  Enframing stills our experience 
and restricts events of truth.  This stillness does not bring forth objects as themselves but 
allows objects to appear only as standing reserve.  For Dewey and Heidegger, this is a 
world where aesthetic experience would not occur.   
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The point of art in both Dewey and Heidegger is to restore the world to flux.  By 
restoring flux to the world one can extract meaning from it.  For both philosophers one 
can extract meaning through and by the tension of our experience.  For Heidegger 
meaning is created by returning objects to thinging things which occurs through the 
tension and strife of the earth and world.  For Dewey, meaning is created through the 
shifting of the environment and the individual responding to this environment.
47
  This 
shifting cycle is Dewey calls “the rhythm of loss of integration and recovery of union” 
with the environment.
48
  Dewey writes in Art as Experience, “The rhythm of loss of 
integration with environment and recovery of union not only persists in man but 
becomes conscious with him; its conditions are material out of which he forms 
purposes.”
49
   Since flux is that which engenders direct experience and direct experience 
is the genesis of all meaning, flux is the genesis of all meaning.  For both philosophers 
this flux is the basis by which meaning can be extracted from the world.  Therefore, for 
Dewey and Heidegger art is concerned with overcoming a sense of meaninglessness 
through understanding the world as a world of flux.  A world in flux is the only one in 
which can engender meaning.   
For both Heidegger and Dewey, by restoring this flux to the world one is able to 
extract meaning from the world.  For both philosophers, art is ultimately concerned with 
overcoming a sense of meaninglessness in the modern world.  For Heidegger, as we saw 
in the last chapter, aesthetics creates a tension between the earth and the world such that 
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the interplay between the two returns objects to objects in themselves, objects in flux.  
For Dewey, as we will see, aesthetics experience is the process of the environment 
presenting something and the individual responding to his or her environment in such as 
ways as to create a rhythm or a drama.  In both attempts to restore flux to the world each 
philosopher makes art a necessity.  Through Heidegger we can see that modernity 
creates a problem in our environment in which the organism must respond. 
As we have seen, Dewey does not mention nihilism or the effects nihilism could 
have on society.  However, through understanding Heidegger one can see that Dewey’s 
thoughts can and ought to be understood in such a framework.  In this way, John Dewey 
and Martin Heidegger mutually inform each other.  Since art in both Heidegger and 
Dewey have similar purposes, John Dewey’s thoughts on art directly apply to the 
problem of nihilism. 
 The movement that follows seeks to show the way in which the philosophy of 
John Dewey draws implications within Heidegger’s thought.  As was addressed in the 
last chapter, Heidegger understands art to have the ability to free the individual from this 
nihilistic age.  Society requires help to be removed from this nihilistic age.  This art 
comes down from a designated individual, the poet.  Though, through Dewey’s emphasis 
on experience, one can see the importance of personal responsibility.  Dewey transforms 
each of us into Heidegger’s poet.  In order to achieve this it will be necessary to broaden 
certain Heideggerian definitions, specifically the definition of art.  This is not a rejection 
or critique of Heidegger but rather an opening-up of his thought.  The way in which his 
thought will be opened up is through the philosophy of John Dewey.  The element 
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within Dewey that allows this opening is his emphasis on experience.  It will be through 
this emphasis on experience that one will see the turn to personal responsibility that 
informs the answer to the question “Where do we turn aesthetically to escape from 
nihilism?”  While Martin Heidegger ends his discussion of art on one’s experience of it, 
John Dewey begins his discussion with one’s experience of art. 
The heart of art for Dewey is experience.  It happens regardless of one’s 
intentions and it is the basic result of life.  However, it is the basic structure of 
experience that is noteworthy.  This general structure is characterized by two very 
important aspects.  Firstly, experience is characterized by what Dewey refers to as the 
rhythm of loss of integration and recovering of union.  Dewey writes,  
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the 
march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either through 
effort or by some happy chance.  And, in a growing life, the recovery is never 
mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and 
resistance through which it has successfully passed.  If the gap between the 
organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies.  If its activity is not 
enhanced by temporary alienation, it merely subsists.  Life grows when a 
temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies 
of the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives.
50
 
 
Dewey relates this passage to what Santayana called “hushed reverberations.”
51
  Life, 
says Dewey, is characterized by a process of losing step and regaining step with society.   
This cycle of “alienation and reconstitution” is both the tension that brings about 
meaning and the way by which the organism is enabled to grow.
52
  The organism is 
alienated and then reconstituted.   
                                                 
50 Ibid., 535 
51 Qtd. in Dewey, The Philosophy of John Dewey: two volumes in one, ed. McDermott, 539. 
52 John McDermott, “Introduction” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, xxix. 
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Secondly, the general character of experience is essentially “double-barreled.”  
Meaning, experience has two aspects to it, doing and undergoing.  Undergoing here is 
understood as enduring, sufferings, and abiding.  Dewey proclaims, “Experience is 
primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something; of suffering and 
passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words.  The organism has to endure, to 
undergo, the consequence of its own actions.”
53
  In the same way, he understandings that 
one can not simply undergo.  Dewey reasons, 
Undergoing, however, is never mere passivity.  The most patient patient is more 
than a receptor.  He is also an agent—a reactor, one trying to experiments, one 
concerned with undergoing in a way which may influence what is still to happen.  
Sheer endurance, side-stepping evasions are, after all, ways of treating the 
environment with a view to what such treatment will accomplish.  Even if we 
shut ourselves up in the most claim-like fashion, we are doing something; our 
passivity is an active attitude not an extinction of response.  Just as there is no 
assertive action, no aggressive attack upon things as they are, which is all action, 
so there is no undergoing which is not on our part also a going on and a going 
through.
54
 
 
It is upon this basis that Dewey then declares that “Experience…is a matter of 
simultaneous doings and sufferings.
55
  Consequently, complete passivity is impossible.  
Organisms always act.  This process of alienation and reconstitution, of hushed 
reverberations, within general experience is characterized by our doings and 
undergoings.  Every organism has both kinds of associations their environment.  
However, the intensity and the level of the organism’s participation characterize these 
experiences as either aesthetically imbued or aesthetically vapid. 
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There are two poles of experience.
56
  One has an aesthetic element to it; the other 
type of experience is aesthetically drab.  Although experience is a basic result of life, 
Dewey writes, “Oftentimes, however, the experience had is inchoate.”
57
  The distinction 
between these two types of experience is the distinction Dewey makes between inchoate 
experience and having an experience.  As we will come to see, having an experience not 
only has an aesthetic dimension but it is through this notion of having an experience that 
will open up the definition of art such that it will allows for a turn to personal 
responsibility.  What follows focuses on having an experience because the 
characteristics of having an experience mirror the qualities of art.  However, it is first 
necessary to outline the characteristics of inchoate experience. 
Inchoate experience is a result of the individual not being a passionately active 
participant with the world around.  Things happen to the organism; however, the 
organism does not interact within these experiences, merely alongside them.  These 
experiences are neither concluded nor brought to consummation.  This kind of individual 
has experiences but since he or she is not a committed and engaged member of these 
experiences, the organism only experiences that which is fractured, withheld, or 
shortened.  Experiences of this sort never come to their natural climax or ending.  Dewey 
writes, “Things happen, but they are neither definitely included nor decisively included 
nor decisively excluded; we drift…There are beginning and endings, but no genuine 
                                                 
56  While two distinct types of experience are identified by John Dewey in his chapter “Having an 
Experience,” found in Art as Experience (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), 35-57, it is important to note 
that these two types are two poles are a very large spectrum.  Experience can fall anywhere between the 
two poles. 
57  Dewey, The Philosophy of John Dewey: two volumes in one, ed. McDermott, 555. 
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initiations and concludings.”
58
  The organism disengages their experience before any 
meaning, nutrition, or meaning can be extracted.  Consequently, these experiences are 
near homogenous.  The only difference being the location of these fractured experiences 
cut short.  This is what Dewey means when he identifies these experiences as inchoate, 
they barely exist.  These experiences offer no nutrition to the individual because the 
experience is cut short before meaning can be extracted. 
 By contrast, having an experience is distinguished by primarily four things 
things.  It is primarily distinguished by the individual actively participating with his or 
her surrounding environment and, as a result, by a kind of conclusion, or consummation, 
to the event.  Firstly, when the organism has an experience, he or she is participating 
with and through the environment around them.  Dewey deduces, “Direct experience 
comes from nature and man interacting with each other.”
59
  Having an experience “is 
like breathing.”
60
  It “is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings.”
61
  Secondly, having an 
experience is characterized by the process of drawing meaning, connections, and 
relations between events and happenings.  These meanings and relations are what bring 
an experience to consummation.  The build up, or consummation, of experiences yields 
a conclusion.  “A ‘conclusion’ is no separate and independent thing; it is the 
consummation of a movement.”
62
  This conclusion is the nectar of the series of 
experiences.  This consummation of experience is only possible when an individual 
participates within the environment and becomes a member of the doings and 
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undergoings.  When one has an experience, one brings the series of experiences to 
consummation.  A series of experiences brought to consummation is able to have 
nutrients, meaning, and purpose extracted from it.  Contrariwise, a fractured experience 
yields nothing but the inchoate.  Like a tree that has been up rooted before its fruit can 
ripen, experience halted before it can develop can offer the individual no fruit.  
 Thirdly, it is not bare response to environment that designated an experience.  It 
is also distinguished by the rhythm of experience.  This rhythm is metered by the 
nutrition one can potentially extract from experience.  Dewey instructs, “If we move too 
rapidly, we get away from the base of supplies—of accrued meaning—and the 
experience is flustered, thin, and confused.  If we dawdle too long after having extracted 
a net value, experiences perishes of inanition.”
63
 This rhythm is similar to the pound of a 
pulse.  Correspondingly, the connection between a pound or a pulse is the time between 
the beats.  Each beat is meaningless in and of itself but within the rhythm the beats find 
meaning.  Consequently, the beats within the rhythm are closely related to each other.  
Dewey writes, “The flights and perchings [of experience] are intimately connected with 
one another; they are not so many unrelated lightings succeeded by a number of equally 
unrelated happenings”
64
  The connections of the pulse or rhythm of experience brings 
forth brings forth new potentially meaningful experiences that are “pregnant with 
connections.”
65
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Hickman and Thomas Alexander (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 48 
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Fourthly, “have” here is not understood as a “have” of ownership but as one 
“has” a friendship.
66
  When one has an experience one has a relation to the experience.  
Regarding aesthetic experience, one does not merely act in the world, but with and 
within the world.  This relationship, however, is a delicate one.  This does not mean the 
individual simply takes control of the situation and thereby has an experience.  Rather, 
the individual enters the situation presented, almost by request of the environment.  
Dewey declares, “integral experience moves toward a close, an ending, since it ceases 
only when the energies active in it have done their proper work.”
67
  The name Dewey 
designates for the organism that participates in these characteristics he deems “the live 
creature.”  The name designates two important characteristics.  On the one hand the term 
“live” represents the act of the individual being an active member of the environment.  
On the other hand, the term “creature” designates the individual’s membership within 
the environment.  Consequently, the live creature is an active part of his or her 
environment.  One who is practiced at having an experience is a live creature.   
Not every experience is brought to consummation.  Unfortunately, experiences 
brought to consummation are not as frequent as one would hope. The aesthetic life does 
not hide from us but there are still enemies to the aesthetic.  These enemies are actions 
which offer a quick retreat, a resignation, or an abdication from one’s current situation.  
Dewey evinces,  
The enemies of the esthetic are neither the practical nor the intellectual.  They are 
the humdrum; slackness or loose ends; submission to convention in practice and 
intellectual procedure.  Rigid abstinence, coerced submission, tightness on one 
                                                 
66  John McDermott, The Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One, 554. 
67  Ibid., 560. 
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side and dissipation, incoherence and aimless indulgence on the other, are 
deviation in opposite directions from the unity of an experience.
68
 
 
Likewise, Dewey continues,  
The non-esthetic lies within two limits.  At one pole is the loose succession that 
does not begin at any particular place and that ends—in the sense of ceasing—at 
no particular place.  At the other pole is arrest, constriction, proceeding from 
parts having only a mechanical connection with one another.  There exists so 
much of one and the other of these two kids of experience that unconsciously 
they come to be taken as norms of all experience.”
69
 
 
Three essential enemies come out of these selections.  First, though experience has a 
general structure the intensity of these “hushed reverberations” can be stilted, halting 
them to near stagnation.  This stiltedness is the aesthetically drab.  Experience of this 
sort describes the person whose existence appears lifeless and automatic. Second, he 
points out that experience consigned to habit offers no aesthetic value.  Aesthetic 
experience is absconded when habit drives experience.  When controlled by habit the 
individual cannot be passionately engaged within the environment.  Rather, the 
individual is something of a machine.  Experience devoid of the aesthetic value is 
characterized by the aimless or mechanistic doings of an organism.  Whenever 
experience is either mechanical or aimless, as Dewey points out, the aesthetic quality is 
distant from experience.  Third, Dewey speaks of the compartmentalization of 
experience that hinders the full force of the aesthetic.  Meaning, one experience is 
quarantined from another.  The aesthetic experience, by contrast, is a coming together, a 
completeness.  This is one of the reasons Dewey seeks to remove dualisms whenever 
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possible.  Dualisms contribute to the compartmentalization of experience.  A habit is a 
withholding of the individual.    
As we have seen, the aesthetic life is defined as the process of one being 
presented with a situation from his or her environment and then the individual 
responding to the environment.  Jazz is an excellent illustration of this process of 
alienation and reconstitution.
70
  When the music starts, the rhythm begins, slowly at first 
but the tempo rises.  Then once the rhythm is established the soloist begins.  The jazz 
solo and the soloist exemplify the aesthetic life. 
It is essentially the rhythm that the soloist maneuvers around.  The musician’s 
improvisation ebbs and flows and zigzags, over, around, and under the basic rhythm 
played by the other instruments.  What is significant is how the soloist responds.  When 
the soloist enters the music he or she knows that there are a number of notes open to 
them.  The best kind of jazz attempts to stretch the possible number of notes the soloist 
plays.  When the soloist is playing at times two instruments may come in and out of 
harmony or collaborate in some other way.  The music can form a pseudo tension 
between the rhythm and the soloist.  Because of this pseudo tension there can appear to 
be a kind of disagreement at times, usually from notes at the farthest outreach of the 
rhythm, but these moments give way to a return to the basic rhythm.  When the 
musicians change key there is realignment or reconstitution with the music’s rhythm.  
                                                 
70 It is worth noting that for the following analogy hip-hop would also be an excellent example.  The beat 
in hip-hop is similar to the rhythm in jazz and hip-hop’s performer acts much like jazz’s soloist.  Each 
presents him or herself within and round the rhythm or beat.  
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The basic rhythm gives form to the music but the beauty comes from the novelty of the 
soloist. 
There are three ways the soloist mimics the live creature.  Firstly, the soloist is a 
paragon of Dewey’s process of alienation and reconstitution.  Dewey writes, “The line 
between the temporary alienation necessary for the enhancement of life and the gap of 
permanent alienation which spells death, physical or spiritual, is a thin one.”
71
  If the 
soloist strays to far from the rhythm, then the music dies.  In the same way, Dewey said, 
“If the gap between organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies.”
72
  
Conversely, if the soloist resigns to remain in the rhythm then the music becomes simple 
habit, safe and predictable.  Similarly, Dewey says of the organism, “If its activity is not 
enhanced by temporarily alienation, it merely subsists.”
73
  The aesthetic life is a 
stretching to and a pushing from the common rhythm of one’s surroundings.  This is 
what Dewey means by “the stable and the precarious.”  Secondly, Dewey understands 
habit to be the killer of any meaningful aesthetic experience, an enemy to experience.  In 
the above example, the jazz musician habit is likewise understood.  In Jazz, the soloist’s 
habit would also remove any meaningful music.  If the soloist resigned to simply play 
the same notes as the rhythm, then the music would be drab, dreary, monotonous, and 
uninteresting.  Thirdly, when the soloist is playing there is not time to remain still and 
reflect on the past notes.  Dewey warns us, “We always live at the time we live and not 
at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each 
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present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future.”
74
 If the 
soloist stopped to reflect on the past notes then the present notes would lack their 
thoughtfulness. 
The aesthetic experience opens up possibility and potentiality.   Aesthetic 
experience is a coming together, a completeness, and a unity.  When one has an 
experience it creates an experience that is pregnant with connections.  These connections 
bear fruit or nectar when these experiences are brought to consummation.  In the buildup 
toward a consummation, singular experiences are connected and related to the others in 
the series.  Theses relations give rise to new meaning and purpose which allows the 
organism to understand the world in a unique, novel, and creative way.  These new 
meanings and purposes allow the individual a new way or perspective and, 
consequently, one’s potential is opened.  Dewey’s own seduction into philosophy is an 
example of this process.  He says,  
“there was derived from that study [on Huxley] a sense of interdependence and 
interrelated unity that gave form to intellectual stirrings that were previously 
inchoate, and created a kind of type or model of a view of things to which 
material in any field ought to conform…I got great stimulation from the study, 
more than from anything I had had contact with before; and as no desire was 
awakened in me to continue that particular branch of learning, I date from this 
time the awakening of a distinctive philosophic interest”
75
 
 
First there was the experience of schooling, then that of reading Huxley.  His 
experiences of studying at the university were brought to a consummation when he was 
able to study Huxley in his last year of studies.  There was then another experience 
related to that study of Huxley that impacted his experience, namely the forming of a 
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model or type of looking at the world.  Finally this opened up John Dewey’s possibility 
by affording him the possibility of experiencing something new, becoming a 
philosopher.  As related to the analogy above, through this process of aesthetic 
experience the organism, or soloist, discovers more notes to play within the rhythm.   
Art itself exemplifies this process of having an experience.  That is to say, a work 
of art is a coming together.  Aesthetic experience is a coming together such that it brings 
the aims or ideals of the individual to the materials of the environment.  Art for Dewey is 
understood as the “union of material and ideal.”
76
  The aesthetic experience is an 
experience in which the organism attempts to confront the environment.  This process is 
a unification of the materials or environment, with the ideal or the intent of the 
individual.  Similarly, in a work of art the artists hope to actualize their vision by 
combining their intended ideal with the materials of the environment.  Dewey reasons, 
In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into a unity, 
and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they do so—just as in a 
congenial conversation there is a continuous interchange and blending, and yet 
each speaker not only retains his own character but manifests it more clearly than 
is his wont.
77
 
 
Art represents our experience.  The same essential relation whereby one can identify an 
aesthetic experience, one can notice the relationship within a work of art.  Art is first 
understood as representing our experience and then second as a work of art.  Dewey 
writes, “Art is thus prefigured in the very processes of living.”
78
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Art is an expression of an experience properly undergone.  As Dewey reasons, 
“Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest upon the earth.  
They are the earth in one of is manifest operations”
79
  In the same way art does not float 
unsupported.  Art is supported by experience and bears the same relation as an 
experience properly undergone.  Fine art, then, is also a representation of the relationship 
of the individual to this surrounding environment.  Fine art is considered art first because 
it represents this relationship between individual and environment.  Consequently 
aesthetics are not bound to the note, the brush, or the canvas.  Rather, aesthetics is bound 
to experience.  Art is experience.  Art then has poured out from just the work of art and 
into experience resulting in the stretching of the definition of art.   
John McDermott writes, “In John Dewey’s philosophy, the task of overcoming 
alienation and reconstitution the processes of living is one which is laced with chance, 
but the responsibility is ours and ours alone.”
80
 The individuals are responsible for their 
maneuverings.  The responsibility is not an imperative from law, morality, or society but 
an imperative of a more general sort.  For Dewey, the responsibility is generated from 
the need for meaningful experience.  We are held accountable for the meaning in our 
lives because there is neither someone else having our experience nor someone else 
undergoing our experience.  This argument for the need of personal responsibility from 
the emphasis will have two facets.  The first facet will concern why we do have a 
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responsibility.  The second facet will concern why one ought to conduct themselves as 
though they have a personal responsibility.
81
   
Because the individual both bears the weight from the consequence of their 
experience and because they act in those experiences to either extract meaningfulness or 
meaninglessness from them, the organism is responsible.  The individual’s doings within 
his or her suffering is the basis by which one can extract meaning.  If one consigns one’s 
self to habit, then one bears the consequences of their decision.  If one carries the 
experience to term, then one also bears the consequence of their decision.  Another name 
for the bearing of the consequences of something is to be responsible for it. 
 Regarding the first facet of the argument, this emphasis on experience creates is 
the basis of the turn to personal responsibility.  Someone else may not undergo for me.  
It is my responsibility.  The failings, shortcomings, and successes are wholly my own 
because they are apart of the doings and undergoing that make up my experience.  The 
fruit of experience, if any, is only the outcome of the individual’s doings and 
undergoing.   
 One can experience aesthetics or a work of art and one can see the shifting of 
earth and world or aesthetically interact with their surroundings.  However, if this were 
the end then experience would be mere undergoing.  As Dewey tells us, experience is 
inundated with undergoing but also with doings.  Even mere passivity is a doing.  To say 
that overcoming nihilism is the organism’s responsibility is to say that one’s doings are 
                                                 
81 It is important to note that for this particular argument to work it does not demand that it be possible for 
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his or her own.  Meaning, the individual bears the full weight of the benefits or 
consequences of their experience.  Another way to say that one bears the weight of the 
consequences of something is to say that one is responsible for it. 
Regarding the second facet of the argument it is a much more existentially and 
philosophically nutritious outlook to declare the individual the locus of action.  Take an 
example of one caught in a well.  It may or may not be possible for one to escape from 
the well, depending greatly on the difficulty of the well.   If one were to sit in the well 
and repeat to him or herself “it is only possible for me to get out with the help of 
another,” then one resigns him or herself to the situation.  Once the individual makes the 
decision to resign then his or her experience ceases to reverberate.  The rhythm of 
alienation and reconstitution ends.  Suppose for a moment that someone was working at 
a big corporation.  Something goes terribly wrong at this corporation.  As a result of the 
problems in the corporation, the laborer begins to have problems at home.  Now it may 
be that the problems at home are unavoidable.  It is also possible to blame the mistakes 
on the problems at work.  However, there is something existentially and pragmatically 
significant about taking the responsibility.  When one takes responsibility for the 
situation they find themselves in, it transforms the individual into the locus of action.   
An individual ought to be responsible for their actions.  
 There are two other possibilities to the argument put forth here.  In overcoming 
nihilism it could either be the responsibility of another or there could be no 
responsibility.  To say that someone else is responsible for one’s overcoming of nihilism 
seems to suggest that someone else could be called to account for another’s actions.  
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However, an individual bears the consequences of his or her own doings and 
undergoings.  To say that no one is responsible seems to suggest that no one bears the 
consequences of the doings and undergoings of the individual.  To say that the individual 
is not in some way responsible suggests that the organism is not acting, in some way, in 
the situation. From Dewey, we know that in experience even utter passivity is action and 
sheer evasion is a doing.  Everything act is a way to do.   
As we have seen the work of art can not be consigned away from experience.  In 
fact art exemplifies our experience properly undergone.  Because this process now finds 
an experiential bedrock, we are called to credit the individual for the nihilistic hold on 
them.  This is significant because of where this emphasis has been placed.  It is the job 
of the individual to remove him or herself from this nihilistic age.  Although we have 
seen the necessary turn toward personal responsibility, this aesthetic process is not 
complete until the aesthetic finds its expression through us.  The consequence of this 
turn is a radical turn towards potentiality and possibility that impacts a society’s 
government, education, and art.  The result of which is not just a removal from nihilism 
but a societal transformation that prohibits this nihilistic age from taking control. 
 In the end, Heidegger’s poet saves the individual from nihilism.  With the help of 
Heidegger we see that John Dewey calls the individual to save him or herself from 
nihilism.  Dewey transforms each person into Heidegger’s poet.  In the following chapter 
we will see the implications of the aesthetic life turned towards personal responsibility.  
The most striking characteristics of Dewey’s conception of art are where Dewey starts in 
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his conception on art and also the transformations that society and the organism undergo 
once the implications of art, the aesthetic life, and the aesthetic turn are unpacked. 
Art, Dewey says, “is the process of making the world a different place in which 
to live.”
82
  Nothing seems broader than this definition of art, but it seems that if art ought 
to be anything then it ought to be the tool to impact the world.  Under this understanding, 
all of Dewey’s philosophy is the process by which one realizes their own ability to create 
art.   
Dewey’s emphasis on experience leads to two important conclusions.  Firstly, 
there is a turn to personal responsibility.  Secondly, Dewey tells us that the aesthetic 
process, and consequently, the aesthetic turn, is not complete until we find an outward 
expression to the art that has been imbued inside.  The process of aesthetic development, 
as we have outlined here, is not complete until one has externalized the art within.  The 
third chapter will chronicle the external manifestations of the art and its implications in 
the political sphere.  The next chapter, then, will focus on this aesthetic externalization, 
what it looks like, and the implications from it.  One need not strain to see these kinds of 
externalizations within society.  They can be found in politics, education, relationships, 
as well as art. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AESTHETIC TURN AND COMMUNITY 
 
The occupants of Camus’ fictional town of Oran are, at first, unremarkable.  
Their lives are like those of most any other town; shallow, selfish, and driven by 
monetary gain.  The town is already in a state that would cause some to proclaim its 
citizens inauthentic or in bad faith; however, the condition gets much worse.  What is 
remarkable is not that the condition gets much worse, most situations do.  The situation 
at Oran becomes distinct because the potential and possibilities of the town’s occupants 
are near completely restricted. 
At the beginning of the novel the townsfolk are complacent and happy with their 
lives.  This beginning condition of the town may or may not be a favorable one; 
however, it is from this beginning condition that the town deteriorates.  The quarantine 
placed on the citizens because of the plague thriving within the city walls restricts their 
potential. 
 One way to view the story is as an allegory.  This allegory focuses not on an 
individual in the town but on the condition of the town as a whole.  As the situation gets 
more and more out of control it forces the occupants of the town to deal, interact, and 
understand their quarantine.  The story of the quarantine is a story about restricted 
potential, about a town whose life became so stable and restricted that even the movie 
theater becomes frighteningly predictable.  Consequently, “the whole town lived as if it 
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had no future” because, in a real way, the town did not have a future.
83
  Their future was 
taken from them when their possibility and potential was so severely restricted.   
The lesson from the town of Oran is not that we ought to seek after the status quo 
that the townsfolk had at the beginning of the novel—that we hope our lives are 
unremarkable as well.  Instead, the lesson is that our condition must ascend rather than 
descend—that we must work against nihilism in order to achieve a kind of opening of 
possibility. Thoreau’s statement, “most men lead lives of quiet desperation,” is another 
way of saying that most people chose the quarantined life rather than a life of freedom 
and potential.  Whatever shape this quarantine takes on, it is the individual’s 
responsibility to work against the quarantines of life that end possibility.  This denial or 
ending of potential is analogous to what Martin Heidegger points out as the condition of 
enframed society since the rise of technology.  
Nihilism is a restriction, a compartmentalization, a stilling, and a quarantining.  
Heidegger and Dewey’s message, then, is directed towards those who have knowingly 
and unknowingly placed themselves within a kind of quarantine.  It is directed toward 
those individuals who have made seemingly irreversible choices, choices that constrict a 
life rather than those that set it free.  These choices are quarantines and though some 
quarantines are thrust upon unwitting recipients, like the ones in The Plague, most 
quarantines are chosen for one’s self.  These choices are like someone choosing shackles 
for themselves.  Accordingly, as is normally the case within existentialism, the choice 
and opportunity for removing these shackles and for change is placed in the hands of the 
                                                 
83 Albert Camus, The Plague (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 258. 
 52 
individual. Once art is internalized it must be externalized.  Whatever comes into the 
body must come out of it.  Heidegger’s poet internalizes art but the individual must 
become the artist and complete the turn.  The art inside must become art outside. 
In this third chapter, I intend to demonstrate the societal implications of the 
aesthetic life and experience.  Moreover, this demonstration will also bear the fruit of the 
societal implications to the aesthetic turn that we have been developing for the past two 
chapters.  Dewey’s aesthetics theory laid out in Art as Experience has a lot to offer, one 
of the upshots of Dewey’s aesthetic life is a transformed understanding of the 
community.  This transformed understanding is made possible because of the turn to 
personal responsibility that was made in the last chapter.  Dewey’s understanding of 
democracy is a radical egalitarianism that is only possible when each person acts 
together.  For this to be possible one must be the arbiter of his or her doings.  In other 
words, one must be personally responsible.  The aesthetic life properly undergone has 
political implications for society.  A community of people that are aesthetically engaged 
is called democracy and a community that is completely aesthetically engaged is called 
the Great Community.  By contrast, an aesthetically impoverished, and ultimately 
nihilistic, society is a totalitarian dictatorship.  The final pages of the chapter, on a 
concluding note, will hope to impress the importance of this work through outlining the 
implications to the individual who discards the importance of the aesthetic life.  This is 
not a kind of moral injunction.  Rather, these final pages are meant to impress and make 
provocative the importance of the aesthetic turn and the potential richness of experience 
one may gain.  One of the most important contributions of an aesthetically engaged 
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community is the perpetual creation of possibility, potential, and freedom.  Toward this 
idea, John McDermott writes that, for Dewey, “politics is the struggle to construct an 
optimum environment for the realizing and sanctioning of the aesthetic processes of 
living.”
84
   
Dewey’s political philosophy is an extension of his aesthetics.  As it was 
mentioned in the last chapter, art “is the process of making the world a different place in 
which to live.”
85
  Therefore, democracy, like the Great community, is a work of art.  
This aesthetic process is “a way of life” that yields a freer society.
86
  As Dewey tells us, 
one’s aesthetic experience is not complete until the affection of the experience finds an 
outward expression.  The result of this outward expression is an opening of possibility 
within both the individual and society.  The Great Community is the term Dewey 
designates for an aesthetically rich society.  As we will see, the Great Community 
operates in much the same way as a work of art does.  In fact, for Dewey, through the 
creation of democracy and the Great Community, one is creating a work of art.  The 
conforming of one’s societal, political, and governmental structure to that of the Great 
Community is one example of an outward expression of an aesthetic experience brought 
to consummation.  Dewey writes, “The material of esthetic experience in being 
human…is social.  Esthetic experience is a manifestation, a record and celebration of the 
life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development, and is also the ultimate 
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judgment upon the quality of a civilization.”
87
  As mentioned in the last chapter, art for 
Dewey is union of material and ideal.  And, since this material can be social, the 
democratic ideal provides the direction by which the experience is aimed.  The idea of 
the Great Community is composed of both material and ideal.  The Great Community is 
a work of art.    
 Dewey’s politics is an outlook or a mode of life that sets itself up as a roadblock 
to nihilistic quarantines. Two reasons the Great Community and art are so beneficial are 
because of the relations that they create and the communication that they foster.  Both art 
and the ideal democratic society create and foster connections, relations, and 
communication between the organism and his or her environment.   
The Great Community is an implementation of the methods and structures that 
facilitate the perpetual opening of potential through experiences that are pregnant with 
connections.  The Great Community is one that is characterized by an education that is 
given to all, communication inclusive of all, a community trust that neglects no one, and 
a respect that is withheld from no one.  This society allows inquiry to drive education, 
which fosters an investigative spirit that demands freedom of the press.
88
  This 
community does not divorce work from play and does not condone a life of habituation, 
which places power back into the hands of the proletariat.  The promise of money does 
not distracted the community with opiates.  Democracy is the name ascribed to the ideal 
mode or aim of society.  Democracy is the collection of these actions and experiences 
properly executed by the community.  Dewey states, “Democracy is belief in the ability 
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of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will 
grow in ordered richness.”
89
  This growth in ordered richness is the opening of potential.  
These actions under gird experience with an aesthetic richness. 
The Great Community is not simply free in the negative sense of removing 
restriction; rather, it is free in the positive sense of a society perpetually moving toward 
freedom.
90
  This means that a properly democratic society is not merely free but always 
progressing toward and opening up new freedoms—much like a jazz soloist always 
creating new notes to play.  The belief in this perpetual movement is democracy.  A 
democratic community always provides the greatest potential for its citizens because of 
democracy’s methods and structures facilitate a society towards a freer community.  
Dewey said, “the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more 
humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute.”
91
  The structures and 
methods formed to instill and inculcate a freer society are communication and 
community.   Dewey writes,  
I am inclined to believe that the heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free 
gatherings of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read 
and uncensored news of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms 
of houses and apartments to converse freely with one another.
92
   
 
The establishment and facilitation of community and communication create, form, and 
evolve relationships.  This communication allows society to guard itself against being 
fractioned and isolated from its members.  These relations that give rise to openness 
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imbues an aesthetic and a beauty in our experience.  The greatest society provides the 
greatest amount choice.   
The open inquiry, open communication, and open relations that find themselves 
within the Great Community are all to the individual’s benefit.  Although, the best 
community will not, ipso facto, create the best individual.  If this were true, then it 
would remove the responsibility from the individual.  Even the individual within the 
worst society has a responsibility to act, grow, communicate, and live within the 
community.  If responsibility could be removed, then the community’s impact on the 
organism would only be a kind of crass causal relation.  The individual still must 
acknowledge, acquiesce, and accept the benefits.   
Habituation in politics, as in aesthetic experience, is an enemy.  In politics habit 
is that factor that keeps the society from realizing its potential.  Dewey says, through 
quoting William James, that habit “alone is what keeps us within the bounds of 
ordinance and saves the children of fortune from the uprising of the poor…habit binds us 
to orderly and established ways of action.”
93
  Art shares this distaste of habit with 
politics because politics is a way of experiencing.  More specifically, this distaste for 
habit is because habit sets itself up as a blockade to forming and creating new relations.  
Since aesthetic experience and the Great Community are both characterized as a 
wellspring of nutritious relations, habit is an enemy of both aesthetic experience and 
politics. 
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Communication is not only a hallmark of the Great Community but is also an 
attribute of a work of art.  It is within art’s capacity to communicate that one can see 
how the aesthetic life directly impacts politics.  Dewey writes, “In the end, works of art 
are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man 
that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience.”
94
  
A work of art opens up possibility.  The communication that art creates facilitates the 
Great Community because it is through communication that the Great Community is 
firmly established.   
By contrast to the Great Community, a totalitarian dictatorship offers something 
like a nihilistic society.  As we see in this quote from Dewey, a totalitarian dictatorship 
offers the same kind of depravity that a nihilistic society does for Heidegger.  Dewey 
says, 
For everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up 
barriers that divide human beings into sets cliques, into antagonistic sects and 
factions, and thereby undermines the democratic way of life. Merely legal 
guarantees of civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly, are of 
little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, 
facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred.  
These things destroy the essential condition of the democratic way of living even 
more effectually than open coercion which—as the example of totalitarian states 
proves—is effective only when it succeeds in breeding hate, suspicion, 
intolerance in the minds of individual human beings.
95
 
  
Here Dewey not only identifies the creation but also the effects of a totalitarian 
dictatorship.  Hindrances on freedom and communication are the perturbations of a 
malicious government, and its symptoms primarily hate, suspicion, and intolerance.  The 
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erosion of communication allows the manipulation of society to the gain of those in 
charge and opens the door for societal alienation.  These symptoms are caused by the 
erosion of connections and relations as a result of the division of human beings.  In 
Heidegger’s understanding, because one is divided from his or her environment, one is 
unable to experience the “thinging thing.”  Also, as in Heidegger, an aesthetic turn 
combats the problems set forth by a totalitarian nihilistic age.  Dewey declares, “Art 
throws off the covers that hide the expressiveness of experienced things…Because the 
objects of art are expressive, they communicate.”
96
  Art communicates in a way that 
allows relations and connections to be made despite the fracture of this nihilistic age. 
The same compartmentalization that was seen as a hindrance to aesthetic living 
in the last chapter is also in the quote above to be the destruction of the Great 
Community.  This compartmentalization comes about when the communication is 
removed between organisms.  The removal of communication fractures the organisms 
from each other and alienates each organism for the others.  A totalitarian government is 
a community of individuals stripped of communication with each other causing distance 
and ruptures from within the community.  A totalitarian government is essentially the 
destruction of the community, which comes at the hands of the destruction of 
communication.  From the destruction results the disharmony and disunity that allows 
the government to control or handle the now fractured organisms.   
For Dewey, a totalitarian, and ultimately nihilistic, government is the name given 
to the destruction of everything Dewey’s philosophy hopes to achieve: a community rich 
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and active in the aesthetic process of living.  Both autocratic governments and nihilism 
destroy community by isolating the individual and destroying both proper education and 
communication with the other members of a society.  It removes the societal spirituality 
outlined in Dewey’s A Common Faith by destroying the community’s ability to come 
together in action or operation, and, consequently, destroys that which allows each 
individual to be apart of something greater that ourselves, the community.  A totalitarian 
dictatorship destroys aesthetic experience by fracturing and compartmentalizing 
experience, and one another.  Therefore, both dictatorships and nihilism destroy 
relationships—the same relationships that form the basis of Dewey’s notions of beauty, 
spirituality, community, and art.  And then, nihilism fractures the only thing left as a 
result from such alienation and isolation, the individual. 
Although I wish my final words were ones that spoke of the triumphs of men and 
women, my experience does not seem to validate this.  For Heidegger as well, most 
people are enframed.  My experience has taught me that this rebellion from the common 
place, from habituation, and from our nihilistic age lives within only a select few.  My 
experience has taught me that the enemies of experience, of aesthetics, and of the Great 
Community grow stronger while humanity grows more entrenched in nihilism.  The 
enemies of experience, habit, laziness, and resignation, leech onto experience.  So, 
instead, my next words are of the walking dead, those who have removed any kind of 
potential in their life and who have restricted and quarantined themselves.  As in Camus’ 
The Plague, though death was all around the citizens of Oran, even the healthy 
townspeople were dying in a very real way.  This severe restriction is precisely what 
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death is, the complete end of potential.  Consequently, those who restrict their potential, 
resign themselves to the walls of Oran, and remain in their nihilistic state, are killing 
themselves. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
We have now accomplished the task set before us.  Not only have we provided a 
proper account for an aesthetic annulment of nihilism, but within this annulment we also 
have a conception of democracy that prohibits nihilism’s return.  The aesthetic turn 
properly undergone in the face of nihilism, then, also improves our society.  It is an 
aesthetic turn that brings about a moment of truth, confronts modern technology’s 
enframing, and vitalizes the individual in place of religion’s absence.  I would like to 
take a moment and refract this recent ending toward some considerations in the 
beginning chapter, and then speak briefly as to what kind of further project may 
strengthen this thesis. 
Heidegger teaches us that the current conditions of things are the fault of the 
individual.  When religion ceased to be the arbiter of meaning, instead of the individual 
proclaiming that role, the role was designated to science and technology.  As Heidegger 
points out, Technological enframing came about first from the condition of the 
individual and then modern technology took on these attributes.  It was not the fault of 
technology but the fault of the individuals for shaping technology in this way.  
Heidegger instructs us in much the same way as Cassius did when he said to Brutus 
“The fault, dear Brutus, in not in the stars but in ourselves.”
97
  Dewey’s emphasis on 
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experience shows us that if the induction of the problem is our responsibility, then the 
abdication of the problem ought to be our responsibility as well. 
The personal responsibility generated from Dewey’s emphasis on experience 
shows us a particular insight in politics.  When the genesis of action is placed on the 
shoulders of each individual it creates a kind of egalitarianism.  The name for this 
particular egalitarianism Dewey calls democracy.  Since Dewey’s conception of 
democracy calls for a society ever increasing the potentiality of its citizens, the 
restricting hand of nihilism cannot take hold.  Democracy is nihilism’s stopbank.  
Though, were democracy to be abandoned, then the bank would crumble, the individual 
would fracture, and the aesthetic life would seek asylum in a select few.  Much like it 
does today.  The effort to increase the aesthetic life is a community effort, or, as Dewey 
says, “a way of life.”
98
  For Dewey, the complete aesthetic experience is one that finds 
an expression.   
In order to strengthen and implement this thesis, one ought to consider how this 
nihilistic age still goes unnoticed.  Working towards elucidating our present condition, 
could strengthen the importance and aid the implementation of this present work.  
Through this elucidation, the present erudition of this work might be noticed outside the 
walls of philosophy, which could allow for the potential aesthetic possibilities within our 
culture to open up. Politics is the study of community, but acting properly political can 
create art and beauty.  Reconstituting one’s society in order to make it freer and more 
humane will not only improve education, communication, trust, and experience as a 
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whole, but it will also create a beautiful and aesthetically rich community.  The 
consequence of which is society indwelt with a beautiful pedagogy, beautiful 
communication, beautiful trust, and beautiful experience. 
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